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Looking at the same interaction and seeing something different: The role of 
information, judgment perspective and behavioural coding on judgment ‘accuracy’ 
 
We often make judgments about others’ personality based on limited informational 
cues and in varying contexts, including interacting with a person or observing them from afar. 
The validity of such first impressions can have far-reaching outcomes for the success of 
future interactions, the types of people we choose to befriend and trust, and even the 
effectiveness of therapeutic interventions (see Funder, 1999). Research indicates that the 
validity or ‘accuracy1’ (i.e., similarity between an individual’s personality score and another’s 
perception of that individuals personality) of initial judgments can be high, which is 
surprising given the limited cues that are available in first impression encounters. Although 
recent studies have demonstrated the complexity in judgment accuracy in terms of 
moderators such as interaction demands (Wall, Taylor, & Campbell, 2016) and context type 
(Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002; Letzring, Funder, & Wells, 2006; Wall, Taylor, 
Dixon, Conchie, & Ellis, 2013; see Funder 1999 for detailed overview) further exploration 
into when and how people form judgements of another’s personality is warranted. In support, 
Back and Nestler (2016) have recently suggested that accuracy research can benefit from a 
focus on more complex moderators in addition to an increased understanding into how 
accurate judgments are formed. In an effort to provide a more nuanced understanding of 
when and how judgment accuracy is likely to be affected the present study comprises three 
phases of data collection to explore three specific questions. First, we ask - when are we more 
                                                 
1 In this paper judgement accuracy is assessed via the correlation between a person’s personality score 
(measured as an average of self and informant ratings) and a judgement made about that person’s personality by 
a stranger. We acknowledge that the term ‘accuracy’ is a loaded term (see also Funder, 1999) and is often 
measured and defined in terms of self-other agreement (Bernieri, Zuckerman, Koestner, & Rosenthal, 1994; 
Funder & West, 1993; see also Wood & Funder, 2016). As the present study correlates an average of self and 
informant ratings with judgements, the use of ‘self-other agreement’ would be misleading. We do also 
acknowledge that the term ‘similarity’ has been suggested as a more appropriate way by which to describe 
accuracy scores hence our use of apostrophes and inclusion of this footnote. 
likely to make accurate judgments; second, we ask who is more likely to be an accurate judge 
as a function of their judgment perspective (i.e., Interactant or Observer). Finally, we explore 
the behavioural cues that are used by Interactants versus Observers’ when rating another’s 
personality. To the best of our knowledge, the current investigation represents the first study 
to explore different informational contexts, judgment perspectives and behavioural coding. 
 
1. Theoretical Overview: How do we make Judgments of Others?  
Funder (1995, 1999) proposed a model of judgement accuracy known as the Realistic 
Accuracy Model (RAM). RAM posits that judgment accuracy is a result of a four stage 
interpersonal and cognitive process (Letzring et al., 2006). Specifically, in order for a successful 
judgement to be made, a target must display behaviours that are available to the judge; those 
behaviours must be relevant to the target‘s personality; the judge must then detect the cues; and 
finally utilise the cues to make an ‘accurate’ judgment. RAM is interpersonal in the sense that a 
judge has to either observe or interact with an actual target who makes relevant behaviours 
available and is cognitive in the sense that a judge has to detect and utilise this target information 
in order to form an ‘accurate’ judgment (see Figure 1). Studies exploring RAM have found 
evidence in favour of what has commonly been referred to as the trait visibility effect (Funder 
& Colvin, 1988; Watson, Hubbard & Weise, 2000), which provides support for RAM. That 
is, visible traits such as extroversion, or those with frequent and clear behavioural cues, yield 
better ‘accuracy’ than less visible traits (e.g., John & Robins, 1993; Watson, 2010). The 
implication being that if accuracy is based on observing the availability of cue relevant 
behaviour, as implicated in RAM, then there should be an advantage when rating visible traits 
with numerous cues relative to non-visible traits with less cue availability. In support, the 
more visible trait of extraversion tends to be the most accurately judged trait in first 
impression studies (Borkenau & Liebler, 1992; Watson, 1989) and has been shown to 
correlate significantly with noticeable cues such as physical attractiveness (Albright, Kenny 
& Malloy, 1988) and loudness of voice (Borkenau & Liebler, 1992). Conversely, less visible 
traits such as neuroticism and agreeableness are typically judged with less accuracy (e.g., 
John & Robins, 1993) and less evidence exists on the behavioural indicators for these traits. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Utilising this model as a conceptual framework for the current research a number of 
moderators are relevant to RAM and are the topic of current investigation. Specifically, the 
literature indicates that there are four moderators of accuracy: judge, target, trait, and 
information (Funder, 1999, 2001). Research suggests that certain types of people are better 
judges of another’s personality (Human & Biesanz, 2012; Letzring, 2008), that some targets 
are just easier to judge (Akert & Panter, 1988), and that some traits are simpler to judge than 
others (Gosling et al., 2002). In the current study we are particularly interested in the final 
moderator variable – information, as it directly relates to the amount and the quality of the 
cues that are available to the judge. We propose that if first impression judgments are 
predominantly driven by the availability of relevant behavioural cues, as posited in RAM, 
then an increase in the quality and quantity of cues available should increase judgment 
accuracy.  
 
2. Overview of Current Study 
The present three-phase study utilises RAM as a conceptual framework with three 
major aims: i) to explore the impact of different information contexts on judgement accuracy; 
ii) to investigate whether judgement perspective (i.e., interactant or observer) influences 
accuracy and; iii) to identify the behavioural cues that people use when judging another’s 
personality in addition to identifying which of these cues are valid indicators of personality.  
Phase 1 employed a ‘get to know’ task and a ‘negotiation’ task using a design similar 
to that implemented previously by Funder and Colvin (1991).  Specifically, pairs of 
participants completed two ‘get to know’ interactions with different interaction partners 
followed by a third ‘negotiation’ interaction with the same partner as in the second ‘get to 
know’ interaction. After each interaction, interacting pairs rendered judgements of each 
other’s personality. Phase 2 employed the data from Phase 1 as stimuli for a group of 
observers. Specifically, to investigate whether those involved in, or observing, an interaction 
differ in judgement accuracy, the judgements from observers in phase 2 were compared with 
the judgments from interactants in phase 1. Finally, phase 3 employed a behavioural coding 
approach to explore the role of behavioural cues on judgment accuracy for interactants and 
observers. To the best of our knowledge, no study has compared the impact of judgement 
perspective on accuracy nor explored the different behavioural cues used by interactans and 
observers when judging another’s personality.  Therefore, the present study aims to extend 
current knowledge of when and how people form accurate judgments when faced with 
limited information.  
 
3. Phase One: The Role of Information on Judgment Accuracy 
As implicated in RAM, the information that manifests within a context affects the cues 
that are available and relevant to a judge. This information variable is often conceptualised in 
two ways (Letzring et al., 2006). The first is in terms of information quantity, which typically 
refers to the amount of information available to the judge and thus relates to RAM’s availability 
stage (see Figure 1). For example, evidence showing that friends make more ‘accurate’ 
personality judgments than strangers is typically explained by reference to information quantity, 
since knowing someone for longer means that the judge will have observed more cues from the 
target’s behaviour in more contexts (Jackson, Neill, & Bevan, 1969; Norman & Goldberg, 1966; 
Paulhus & Bruce, 1992). A similar result comes from varying the breadth of cues available, such 
as whether the stimulus information available to judges is non-verbal, audio or visual (Reynolds 
& Gifford, 2001). The second way in which information can differ is in terms of information 
quality. Information quality relates more closely to RAM’s relevance stage since different cues 
can be more or less diagnostic of different aspects of personality (i.e., represent better quality 
information). For example, Letzring et al. (2006) have shown that judgment accuracy is higher in 
unstructured ‘getting acquainted’ contexts versus structured ‘debate’ situations because behaviour 
in the latter context tends to be more constrained and thus less diagnostic (i.e., relevant) of 
personality. 
The majority of first impression studies consider information quantity (e.g., 
Blackman, 1995; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Watson & Clark, 1991) and have revealed that 
more information tends to produce more accurate judgments (Beer & Watson, 2010; 
Blackman & Funder, 1998; Borkenau & Liebler, 1992; Holleran Mehl, & Levitt, 2009; 
Letzring et al., 2006). In contrast, much less research has examined how information quality 
shapes judgment accuracy (cf McLarney-Vesotski, Bernieri & Rempala, 2006; Letzring et al., 
2006). Importantly, Beer and Brooks note that information quality is largely under examined; 
thus, the question of what constitutes ‘good quality information’ when rating another’s 
personality remains an open area of inquiry. The present study, therefore, aims to explore the 
role of information quality on accuracy. More specifically, it is argued here that one useful 
way to think about information quality may be in terms of different contexts of interaction 
which vary in terms of the task and partner. 
Research investigating variations in the partner aspect of context have tended to focus 
on information quantity (Bernieri, Zuckerman, Koestner, & Rosenthal, 1994; Paulhus & 
Bruce, 1992). These studies show that acquainted partners tend to be more accurate at rating 
each other’s personality (e.g., Funder & Colvin, 1991; Norman & Goldberg, 1966; Paulhus & 
Bruce, 1992). The implication underlying this finding is that the longer we interact with a 
person the more behavioural information we have available (i.e., information quantity). It is 
argued here that differences in partner aspects of context are likely to impact not just on 
information quantity but on information quality. More specifically, interacting with the same 
person over time increases not only the amount of behavioural information available but also 
the quality of information on which to base our judgments (Funder, 1999; Letzring et al., 
2006). Put another way, in addition to sharing more information about themselves, people 
interacting with the same partner multiple times may also be more likely to share information 
that is relevant about aspects of their personality. However, to the best of our knowledge, the 
impact of interacting with the same person over time in first impression encounters remains 
untested.  
 
In addition to theorising about the importance of contextual variations in partner on 
the trait specific cues available in an interaction, the contextual task may also be important. 
Specifically, different tasks inherently require different kinds of behaviour and this may 
impact on the types of information a target reveals. For example, if a target is asked to make a 
presentation and to answer questions as part of an interview, their behaviour during each of 
these tasks is likely to differ owing to different demands of the tasks. The majority of 
research, however, only alludes to the possibility that qualitatively different tasks will shape 
the relevance of information available (i.e., trait specific cues available) for personality 
judgments. Although not framed as differences in ‘task’ per se, a number of studies have 
examined differences between structured and unstructured information contexts (e.g., Carney, 
Colvin, & Hall, 2007). Structured interaction contexts typically involve some form of 
constraint either in the topic discussed or in the rules for discussion (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). 
They therefore give little room for behavioural variation. By contrast, unstructured 
interaction contexts in which participants ‘talk about anything’ or ‘get to know’ each other 
(e.g., Carney et al., 2007) permit a greater expression of personality relevant information 
(Borkenau et al., 2004; Funder & Colvin, 1991).  Structured contexts such as trivia quizzes 
(Letzring et al., 2006), debates (Borkenau et al., 2004), and toy building (Blackman, 1996), 
tend to produce less accurate judgments than are typically found in unstructured contexts and 
have led to the conclusion that unstructured interaction contexts render better quality 
information when rating another’s personality. Although the structured-unstructured 
distinction is useful for understanding the types of contexts that contain good quality 
information, it represents a broad dichotomy that overlooks trait-specific differences. For 
example, structured contexts such as ‘debates’ and ‘interviews’ which tend to be perceived as 
more likely to constrain the natural expression of trait relevant behaviour may contain good 
quality information for specific types of traits. One way to think about such contextual 
nuances is to consider the mapping between the kinds of cues that are salient to a task and the 
traits that are likely to relate to those cues (see McLarney-Vesotski et al., 2006). As an 
example, consider the task of negotiating, which is a task that participants of the present 
study were asked to complete.  Negotiation is a structured task and cues relevant to the traits 
of openness, conscientiousness and neuroticism are likely to be available.  For instance, 
creating value, also known as integrative bargaining, is a process central to negotiation. It 
involves discovering the other person’s interests so that creative solutions can be generated 
(e.g., Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). This kind of behaviour should elicit more accurate 
judgments for the trait of openness, since a major facet of this trait concerns imagination and 
creativity. Second, claiming value, also known as distributive bargaining, is the process of 
taking the resources available and dividing it amongst targets. This behaviour arguably 
requires a degree of planning about the resources that are most preferable to oneself and 
others. As conscientiousness is related to social responsibility and planning, as well as to 
forward thinking (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993), it would seem plausible to predict that 
this trait may be judged accurately in negotiation situations. Third, negotiations are 
affectively charged in nature (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Kumar, 1997). This may 
increase the likelihood of trait relevant behaviour for the affectively charged trait of 
neuroticism, since people high on this trait tend to be anxious, and highly emotional 
(Goldberg, 1993).  
When thinking about the relations between the cues available in a context and the 
traits to which such cues relate, the ‘get to know’ and ‘negotiation’ tasks may represent useful 
interaction contexts through which to explore the role of trait specific cues on accuracy. In 
particular, it would be useful to examine whether negotiation tasks are more diagnostic of 
particular traits in the ways outlined above. In line with the aforementioned behavioural 
differences that may occur in the different tasks outlined, the following hypotheses are made: 
          H1: Judgment accuracy for all Big-5 traits will be more accurate in the final 
negotiation context than the second get to know context due to an increase in both the amount 
of information (i.e., same partner in interactions 2 and 3) and trait specific information (due 
to different tasks). 
        H2:  Judgment accuracy for the traits of openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism 
will be judged more accurately in the negotiation context than in either of the ‘get to know’ 
contexts as the quality (i.e., relevance, trait specificity) of information for these traits should 
be greater.  
 
4. METHOD 
4.1 Phase 1 – The role of information on judgement accuracy 
4.1.1 Participants  
53 unacquainted participants received either £8 monetary compensation or 3 course 
credits for 80 minutes of participation. Participants were recruited via the Universities 
research participation scheme. Of the 53 participants, a core group of 202 Interactants (9 
                                                 
2 The minimum sample size typically recommended for between subjects’ designs is 20 per condition 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Given that within subjects designs typically have more power to 
detect effects, a sample size of 20 for a within subjects design as part of a series of studies was deemed 
males, 11 females) participated in each of the three interaction contexts (Mean age = 21.8, SD 
= 2.3). Self-reported ethnicity of the target participants was 79% White British, 6% Asian, 
3% White Irish, 3% Black African and 9% other. The remaining participants comprised 33 
Informants who were asked to render judgments about their impression of the Interactants 
personality. Interactants provided at least one informant rating (n = 20), and the response rate 
for those who received two informant ratings was 65% (n = 13). These informant scores were 
combined with self-ratings and averaged to derive an aggregate measure of target personality 
(see Wall et al., 2013 for similar approach). The average correlation between self and informant 
ratings across contexts was r = .48 (Range .27 to .69). 
4.1.2 Materials 
4.1.3. Personality Measure. Participants were asked to rate their personalities using 
the 50-item International Personality Item Pool measure (IPIP; Goldberg, 2006). The 
reliability of the 50-item scale was assessed for aggregate personality ratings, and Interactant 
judgments of each other for each Big-5 trait across contexts. Specifically, for aggregate 
personality scores (i.e., an aggregate of self- and informant-ratings), separate reliability 
analyses were conducted on the combined self and informant ratings for each Big-5 trait, 
resulting in an alpha on either 20 items (i.e., 10 items per trait for self and one informant) or 
30 items (10 items per trait for self and two informants) depending on whether an Interactant 
obtained one or two informant ratings. Reliabilities for the traits of extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness were .93, .76, .79, .92, and .89 
for the aggregate personality ratings and were .89, .87, .89, .84, and .89 for the judgment 
ratings.  
4.1.4 Procedure 
                                                 
sufficient for present purposes (see also Wilson VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). Importantly, replication is 
needed to reduce false positives (Fraley & Vazire, 2014). 
Participants signed up to a two-part study advertised as ‘Interpersonal Perception 
between Strangers’. On arrival to the laboratory, pairs of Interactants were allocated to 
separate rooms and introduced to the study.  As the present study comprised a within subjects 
design, they were instructed that they would be asked to participate in a total of three 
interactions over a two week period and informed that the interactions would vary in terms of 
what they would be asked to do (i.e., their ‘interaction task’), and in terms of who they would 
interact with (i.e., their ‘partner’). The order of tasks was consistent for all participants. To go 
beyond some of the limitations with self-reported personality (Alicke, 1985; Kwan, John, 
Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004; Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008), participants were asked to provide 
personality ratings from up to two knowledgeable informants (i.e., people who knew them 
well) so that aggregate personality ratings could be obtained. As noted in the material section, 
informant scores were combined with self-ratings and averaged to derive an aggregate 
measure of target personality (see Wall et al., 2013 for similar approach). 
              4.1.5. Interaction one (New Partner). In this task, participants were separately taken 
to a video lab, sat opposite their fellow Interactant, and were left to interact without the 
experimenter present. They were instructed to talk about “anything they like”.  The lab 
contained unobtrusive video cameras on which their interaction was recorded (participants 
were aware of this). After ten minutes the experimenter returned and separately escorted each 
participant back to their original location so that no further interaction could take place, and 
they were asked to fill out an IPIP questionnaire about their impression of their interaction 
partner’s personality (IPIP-other rating). Participants were then debriefed and scheduled to 
return approximately one week later for interactions two and three. 
           4.1.6. Interaction two (New Partner, Same Task). Participants were randomly allocated 
a partner that was different to that of their first interaction. The rest of the experiment 
proceeded as interaction one. 
            4.1.7. Interaction three (Same Partner, Different Task). This interaction took place 
after Interactants had finished rating their interaction partner from interaction two. The task 
was a modification of the employment contract negotiation task employed by Olekalns and 
Smith (2000). In this task, one person was randomly allocated the role of ‘employer’ and the 
other person the role of ‘employee’.  They then role-played a negotiation over a job contract 
for the position of ‘Graduate Recruitment Consultant’, a position chosen because of its 
relevance to students looking for graduate employment3.  
              After negotiating for ten minutes participants were individually taken to their 
separate rooms and asked to render a judgment of their interaction partner’s personality, 
again using the IPIP-other rating. As they had already rated their Interaction partner in 
interaction two, it was important to ensure that participants did not feel that the purpose of 
this interaction was to change their previous judgment. Thus, participants were assured that 
responses may be the same or different and that there is no right or wrong answer. In an 
effort to avoid judgment ratings being affected by completion of the self-report all 
participants were asked to complete the self-oriented IPIP as a rating of their own personality 
after they had completed all interactions and all IPIP-other ratings, and were then debriefed.  
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Analytic Strategy. Interactants (i.e., person being judged) personality was 
measured using a composite of self and informant ratings (see Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 
2006; Wall, Taylor, & Campbell, 2016 for similar approach). Judgment ‘accuracy’ was 
                                                 
3 Although Interactants were instructed to try to reach an agreement, they were also informed that 
they did not have to reach an agreement; thus, if an aspect was difficult to agree on then they 
could move on to another issue. This was designed to allow for the expression of individual 
differences in behaviour as it stops people agreeing if they do not want to. Indeed, other than the 
standard instructions and pay-off schedule, participants were free to use any other information to 
ensure realism and flow of task 
measured by correlating judgments of Interactants’ personality with Interactant’s composite 
personality score. When selecting an approach to assess accuracy it is important to be 
cognisant of the different measurement approaches (see Cronbach & Gleser, 1959; Wood & 
Furr, 2016). One way by which to assess accuracy is by correlating responses across trait 
items for each target-judge pair, known as profile correlations (i.e., rendering as many scores 
as judges). It has been suggested that this method depends strongly on the extent to which 
each variable reflects "normative" information (Furr, 2008; Wood & Furr, 2016) and factors 
like the scoring of the items. A second method is the item approach which correlates scores 
across persons for each trait or item and was the approach adopted here. That is, item level 
correlations were calculated and then aggregated resulting in as many accuracy scores as 
there were items4. Our decision to use the item approach was due to our focus on trait level 
predictions in addition to interpretational issues with profile scores. It is important to note 
that there are limitations associated with each approach (see Cronbach & Gleser, 1959; 
Funder, 1999), and the error which likely stems from each approach arguably cancels itself 
out across the three interaction conditions (see Letzring, 2008 for similar rationale on issues 
of non-independence).  
Means and SD’s were computed for judgements accuracy per trait across the three 
interaction conditions (see Table 1). In order of magnitude, extraversion was the most 
accurately judged trait across contexts (M = .16, SD = .18), followed by neuroticism (M = 
.17, SD = .14), agreeableness (M = .03, SD = .12), conscientiousness (M = .01, SD = .12), and 
finally openness (M = -.19, SD = .18) across contexts. This pattern of trait ‘accuracy’ is in 
line with previous research which tends to report that extraversion is typically the most 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge that researchers in this area tend to aggregate items prior to correlating; however, as we 
compare accuracy scores across conditions, as opposed to within condition, our analyses would not have been 
possible using summed scale scores as this would have produced only one score per trait preventing univariate 
comparisons. Currently, we have ten scores per trait that can be compared across contexts to address our 
research questions.  
accurately judged trait with openness often being found to be one of the more difficult traits 
to judge (Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988; Funder & Colvin, 1988).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
             Recall that the first hypothesis predicted that judgment accuracy for all Big-5 traits 
would be more accurate in the final negotiation context than the second get to know context 
due to an increase in both the amount of information and trait specific information. The 
hypothesis was supported for the trait of conscientiousness, t(9) = -2.24, p = .04 whereby 
accuracy was higher in the final negotiation task (M = .07; SD = .15) than the second ‘get to 
know’ task (M = -.01; SD = .13). Interestingly, the reverse effect was found for neuroticism 
as there was a significant difference between these two contexts, t(9) = 4.03, p = .01 whereby 
accuracy was higher in the second ‘get to know’ task (M = .37; SD = .19) than the final 
negotiation task (M = .17; SD = .23 ). Counter to hypotheses, analyses found that accuracy 
was not significantly different in the second ‘get to know’ task than the final negotiation task 
for the traits of extraversion, t(9) < 1, p = .91, agreeableness, t(9) = -1.52, p =.16 .05 or 
openness, t(9) < 1, p = .84.  
The second hypothesis that the negotiation task would elicit increased judgment 
accuracy for the traits of conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness when compared to the 
first ‘get to know’ task was examined using a series of paired samples t-tests for each Big-5 
trait with item correlation scores as the Dependent Variable. The hypothesis was not 
supported for conscientiousness, t(9)5 = -1.62, p = .14, neuroticism, t(9) = -1.64, p = .14, nor 
                                                 
5 Although there were 20 participants per condition the degrees of freedom are 9 for each comparison as an item 
analysis was performed with ten IPIP items per trait (see Wall et al., 2013 for similar analysis). Although the 
present within subjects design meets the minimum sample size required for a between subjects design a post hoc 
power analysis was performed for each comparison and the range of power reached was in an acceptable range 
of .70-.90 (see Cohen, 1988 for specific recommendations; see also Fraley & Vazire, 2014 for debate on issue of 
post hoc power). Moreover, the scores are based on an aggregate of self and informant ratings which aims to 
enhance validity. 
openness, t(9) = < 1, p = 99. Thus, qualitative differences in the tasks examined did not 
impact on the accuracy of Big-5 judgments.  
              It is useful to further investigate the finding that neuroticism was rated more 
accurately in the second get to know task than the third negotiation task as this was counter to 
predictions (p = .01). This finding suggests that participants may elicit important behavioural 
differences in the second get to know task; thus, it would seem useful to also compare 
accuracy for the first and second get to know tasks to further understand these findings. A 
series of paired samples t-tests comparing accuracy scores in the first two get to know 
interactions revealed a significant effect for the trait of neuroticism only, which bolsters the 
findings reported above for this trait. Specifically, accuracy was higher in the second ‘get to 
know task’ (M = .37; SD = .19) than the first, (M = -.04; SD = .29); t(9) = -3.23, p = .01. 
The present phase suggests that familiarity with a task may shape judgment accuracy for the 
less interpersonal and typically difficult to judge trait of neuroticism. Although this finding is 
interesting and highlights a differential pattern of trait accuracy across interaction contexts it 
remains unclear whether this enhanced accuracy for neuroticism in the second ‘get to know 
task’ relates to more cues being revealed (i.e. enhanced availability in RAM) and/or better 
detection of cues (i.e., enhanced detection/utilization in RAM). Findings from Funder and 
Colvin’s (1991) study support our suggestion that it may be due to people feeling more 
relaxed which may indicate enhanced detection/utilisation. The findings for 
conscientiousness revealed a different pattern to that of neuroticism and results were in line 
with our prediction that more information would enhance judgement accuracy. When 
considering how we form judgments of others these findings tentatively suggest that 
additional cues may facilitate better judgments. Moreover, when considering the implications 
of these findings for RAM the data suggest that different stages of RAM may be more 
influential when judging specific traits. Specifically, increased detection/utilisation appears to 
be useful when judging neuroticism, which is in line with definitions of this trait as difficult 
to detect through actual behaviour. In contrast, accuracy for conscientiousness appears to be 
more relevant to the availability and relevance stages of RAM as accuracy for this trait 
increased when more information was available.  
 
6. Phase 2: The Role of Perspective Type on Accuracy 
To further understand judgment accuracy in first impression encounters, it is useful to 
consider another moderator of accuracy – the judge. Personality psychologists have dedicated 
years of research to examining the personality characteristics of a ‘good judge’ (e.g., Allport, 
1937; Taft, 1955; Vogt & Colvin, 2003). However, as noted by Letzring (2005) no variables 
have repeatedly emerged as reliable correlates of accuracy (Davis & Kraus, 1997). Although 
it is tempting to conclude that no reliable correlates exist, it is argued here that a focus on the 
task demands of the judge may be a useful avenue of investigation. Specifically, it is 
important to go beyond individual characteristics of judges such as their level of extraversion 
(Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995) and focus more on the informational perspective of 
judges as this may impact on the salience of cues on which judges rely. Indeed, judges 
observing an interaction may be more, or less, accurate when rating a target’s personality 
than a judge directly involved in conversation as the level of engagement in an interaction 
may impact on the processing style judges engage in. Proximate support for this assertion 
comes from a study by Giordano, George, Marett and Keane (2011) who note that Observer 
judgments can suffer as they cannot follow up with questions and are removed from the 
surrounding context that often contains subtle nuances. Such studies, however, have focused 
largely on judgments of deception (e.g., Bonito, Burgoon, Ramirez, & Dunbar, 2000) and it is 
unknown whether these differences will remain when rating another’s personality.  
Moreover, differences have also been found in the way that Interactants and 
Observers process information. For example, Interactants tend to rate others more favorably 
(Burgoon & Newton, 1991), and have also been found to remember and interpret cues 
differently (Stafford, Waldron, & Infield, 1989). Pronin, Fleming and Steffel (2008) also 
found that Targets and Observers perceive self-disclosure differently in terms of the value 
within them. Indeed, a fundamental difference is that Interactants are almost always engaging 
in multiple activities at once (Gilbert, Jones, & Pelham, 1987); thus, it is reasonable to expect 
that personality judgments made by Interactants may suffer relative to that of Observers. 
Taken together, the weight of the existing evidence indicates that Observers may have a 
preferential advantage when rating an Interactants personality, and leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 H3: Observers will be more accurate than Interactants when rating personality across 
context.    
6.1 Participants  
Eighty participants (males = 33, females = 47) with a mean age of 20.1 years, (SD = 
2.01) were recruited from the same University as phase 1 via the Universities research 
participation scheme. Observers also received either £8 monetary compensation or 3 course 
credits for 80 minutes of their time. The interaction data from phase 1 served as stimuli for 
the Observers. 
6.2 Procedure 
On arrival to the laboratory, participants were fully informed that the study was 
interested in ‘Interpersonal Perception between Strangers’. Consistent with the practice of 
others in the field (e.g., Back et al., 2010; Vazire, 2007), Observers worked in groups of four 
so that a mean Observer rating could be computed. Specifically, each Observer was asked to 
watch three interactions recorded in a previous study (i.e., phase 1) so that they could rate 
three different targets. This allowed each target to be rated by four Observers and also 
enabled meaningful comparisons to Interactants’ judgments. Specifically, Observers viewed 
two ‘get to know’ interactions and one negotiation interaction ensuring that Interactants and 
Observers each rated three different targets in total.  
Moreover, as a single recording depicted a pair of Interactants on the screen, 
Observers were explicitly requested to code only the behaviour of one of the two people on 
the video. Once Observers knew which Interactant they had to observe, they were instructed 
to focus exclusively on that person, even when the other Interactant was speaking.  Observers 
were asked to rate their impression of the target’s personality using the IPIP employed in 
phase 1. On completion of their rating of three Interactants, Observers were thanked and 
debriefed.  
 
7.  Results & Discussion 
The extent of convergence across all four Observers (i.e., consensus for the judgment 
data) was assessed using intraclass correlations ICC (2, k) (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979), computed 
using a one-way random effects model (see also Back et al., 2010). In order of magnitude, 
extraversion had an average ICC of .97 across all Observers, followed by conscientiousness, 
.96, neuroticism, .95, agreeableness, .94 and openness, .91. These high ICC’s justify 
averaging across Observers, as is common practice in the field (e.g., Back et al., 2010). These 
average scores produce reliability estimates of .93 for extraversion, .89 for agreeableness, .92 
for conscientiousness, .89 for neuroticism and .79 for openness.  
a. Who is a better judge of another’s personality? 
           When examining accuracy correlations the order of magnitude for Observers was 
similar to that obtained for Interactants in phase 1. Specifically, extraversion was the most 
accurately judged trait (MObservers = .32, SD = .24 vs. MInteractants = .16), followed by 
neuroticism (M = .16, SD = .21 vs. MInteractants = .17), conscientiousness (M = .13, SD = .13 vs. 
MInteractants = .01) agreeableness (M = .03, SD = .17 vs. MInteractants = .03), and finally openness 
(M = .03, SD = .11 vs. MInteractants = -.19). The finding obtained in phase 1 that extraversion, in 
order of magnitude, was the most accurately judged trait and openness the least accurate, was 
replicated for Observers. 
             The third hypothesis that Observers would be more accurate than Interactants was 
tested using a series of independent t-tests. This hypothesis was partially confirmed as 
significant differences were found between Interactants and Observers when rating the less 
interpersonal traits of conscientiousness across contexts, t(9) = -3.52, p = .01, r6 = .76 and 
openness t(9) = -3.24, p = .02, r = .74. Specifically, Observers (M = .13, SD =.04) were more 
accurate at rating conscientiousness than Interactants (M = .01, SD = .04) and were also more 
accurate at rating openness (M =.03, SD = .04) than Interactants (M = -.19, SD = .06). 
Significant differences were not found for neuroticism, p = .95, extraversion, t(9) = -1.67, p = 
.11, or agreeableness, t(9) = < 1, p = .98.  
           To follow up on the finding that Observers were more accurate than Interactants when 
rating conscientiousness and openness and determine whether this interacts with context a 3 
(Context: first ‘get to know’ task, second ‘get to know task’, third ‘negotiation’ task) by 2 
(Judgment Perspective: Interactant, Observer) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for 
these two traits.  In support of the above comparisons, a main effect of perspective-type was 
found for conscientiousness F(1, 18) = 5.15, p = .04, =  .22 and openness  F(1, 18) = 
11.07, p = .001, = .38 whereby Observers were more accurate than Interactants when 
rating these traits. These findings held across context as no interaction effect was found for 
                                                 
6 Effect size r was computed using an effect size calculator (https://www.easycalculation.com/statistics/effect-
size-t-test.php)  
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conscientiousness, F(2,36) = 1.46, p  = .255, = .08 or openness, F(2,36) = 1.03, p = .29, 
= .10.   
Recall that a major aim of this phase was to develop the findings regarding the role of 
information on accuracy in phase 1. Specifically, the findings from phase 1 that judgments 
for neuroticism were more accurately rated in the second ‘get to know’ task than the final 
negotiation task were attributed to increased familiarity which may have enhanced interacants 
detection and/or increased the amount of cues available.  Thus, if the present effect was due 
to Interactants revealing more relevant cues to their personality then Observers should also be 
able to detect these cues.  As Observers were able to rate conscientiousness and openness 
more accurately than Interactants across all contexts this offers tentative support that 
adopting an Observers perspective enhances detection and utilisation. We acknowledge that 
this claim is tentative and warrants further exploration using a behavioural coding approach.  
 The pattern of trait accuracy for Interactants vs. Observers is interesting. More 
specifically, the finding that Observers were more accurate when rating the less interpersonal 
traits of openness and conscientiousness (Gill & Oberlander, 2003; Gosling et al., 2002) 
suggest differences in how these judgment perspectives utilise cues: Do Observers notice 
different cues and/or utilise cues differently to Interactants? One useful way in which to 
explore these questions is to examine the behavioural cues revealed in the different 
interactions alongside an exploration of how such cues differentially relate to Observers’ and 
Interactants’ judgments. Accordingly, the final phase explored this issue using a behavioural 
coding approach. 
 
8. Phase 3: The Role of Behavioural Cues on Personality Judgement Accuracy 
Recall that Funder’s (1995, 1999) model of judgment accuracy posits that in order for 
people to form ‘accurate’ judgments about another’s personality relevant cues to that 
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persons’ personality need to be available and such cues need to be detected and correctly 
interpreted (i.e., utilised). When theorising about how people form judgments this is a useful 
framework through which to further our understanding of judgement accuracy. By 
implication we might conjecture that to understand how we form accurate judgments we need 
to explore the ways in which personality is revealed through behaviour in order to determine 
what specific cues are actually available and whether or not judges are detecting and utilising 
these cues.  
A number of studies have examined the link between behaviour and personality. 
Existing research has focused largely on the trait of extraversion (e.g., Scherer, 1978, 1986), 
which has found that extraverts tend to ‘ask more questions’, are more likely to ‘tell jokes’, 
and tend to ‘initiate more conversations’ than introverts (Argyle, Martin, & Crosland, 1989; 
Thirne, 1987).  Gosling and colleagues (2002) found that the ways in which a person adorns 
their bedroom is indicative of their level of openness. More recently, evidence suggests that a 
great deal about our personality is contained within email addresses (Back, Schmukle, & 
Egloff, 2008), static appearance cues (Vazire, Naumann, Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2008) and a 
person’s clothing (Naumann et al., 2008), and that some of these cues can be reliably inferred 
by judges.  These studies are substantive as they require behavioural coding and in so doing 
encourage researchers to examine ‘real’ behaviour in ‘real contexts’ (Baumeister, Vohs, & 
Funder, 2007).  Building on the behavioural coding approach to understanding personality-
behaviour links, the present study explores the behavioural cues that interactants and 
observers appear to use when making their judgments.  
 
9. Method 
9.1 Participants  
         Forty participants (males = 16, females = 24), all undergraduate students with a mean 
age of 23.9 years, (SD = 2.56), signed up to partake in this behavioural coding study and were 
paid £8 for 80 minutes of their time. Participants were again recruited via the Universities 
research participation scheme and the study was advertised as being interested in ‘Personality 
and Behaviour’. 
9.2 Materials 
9.2.1. Behaviour stimuli. The interaction data from phase 1 served as stimuli for a 
team of coders. Thus, the data set comprised a total of 60 interactions, each lasting 
approximately ten minutes.  
9.2.2 Behaviour Questionnaire. A 26-item questionnaire for measuring behaviour 
was developed for the study. Specifically, in an effort to sample behaviour relevant to each 
Big-5 trait, 12 items were selected from the 100-item IPIP as this measure contains questions 
that directly ask about behavior (see Table 2). An item was selected if it represented a 
behaviour that could feasibly be coded from viewing an interaction. For example, the IPIP 
item ‘starts conversation’ measures a facet of extraversion and represents a behaviour that 
should be accessible to those observing the interaction. Similarly, an example of agreeable 
behaviour that could also be coded from viewing an interaction was “inquires about others’; 
an item for conscientiousness was ‘appears neatly dressed’; an item for neuroticism was 
‘appears anxious’, and an item for openness was ‘catches onto things quickly’.  
        The behavioural items for the more evaluative traits, such as neuroticism and openness, 
were harder to select as they largely concern feelings and, by definition, relate to behaviour 
that is less visible. For example, an item measuring agreeableness that was selected from the 
IPIP was ‘feels little concern for others.’ This item arguably relates to a feeling that would 
need to be inferred and thus could not be assessed ‘objectively’ by coders. Consistent with 
Funder and Colvin (1991), who adapted the Q-sort in a similar fashion, additional items were 
created on the basis of previous research findings (e.g., Berry & Hansen, 2000). For example, 
the additional behavioural items of ‘fidgets’, ‘self-touches’, ‘open body language’, ‘uses 
hands when talking’, ‘smiles’ and ‘nods head’ were added. In support of the inclusion of 
these behaviours, previous research has reported significant correlations between ‘open’ body 
positions and personality (Berry & Hansen, 2000). Also, ‘fidgets’, ‘nods head’ and ‘anxious’ 
have also been employed in Ambady and Rosenthal’s (1998) study and ‘smiles’ were related 
to a person’s level of extraversion in Kenny’s (1992) study. It should be noted, that 
behaviours such as ‘smiles’ and ‘nods head’ are typically coded in concrete ways but were 
coded here in general terms in an effort to capture mid-level, and more stylistic behaviours. 
Thus, no coder counted how many times a person smiled or nodded their heads, but someone 
would receive a high score for ‘smiles’ if they engaged in the behaviour frequently.  
          The decision to adapt a more macro approach to coding behaviour, considering 
behaviour style rather than the instances of a behaviour’s occurrence is supported by Funder 
and Colving (1991) who note that this is often a more valid way to code behaviour. The focus 
on more general, stylistic behaviours is arguably more relevant to the present focus on the 
Big-5 as these traits concern a person’s average level of behaviour in ‘real life’ contexts when 
forming judgements of targets, since judges are unlikely to count the number of times the 
target smiles but may be more likely to employ a general feel for how a person behaves. 
Trained coders have shown themselves to be proficient at reliably coding behaviour in this 
way (Cairns & Green, 1979; See also Funder & Colvin, 1991).   
All items were measured on a 7-point scale that ranged from (1) extremely inaccurate 
to (7) extremely accurate. For example, when coding whether a person ‘fidgets’, participants 
were informed that ‘extremely accurate’ refers to ‘an extremely accurate representation of 
that person’s behaviour’ (i.e., they fidget a lot) whereas ‘extremely inaccurate’ refers to ‘an 
extremely inaccurate representation of that person’s behaviour’ (i.e., they never fidget). 
9.3 Procedure 
           Groups of four participants (i.e., behavioural coders) were asked to watch a total of six 
clips each containing a pair of Interactants engaging in audio and video recorded 
conversation. They were instructed that the study was interested in how people behave during 
an initial encounter with a stranger, and that their task was to code the behaviour of only one 
of the two people in the video.  They were told to focus on that person even when the 
Interactant was listening to their partner. It was emphasised that they must try to remain 
objective throughout the coding procedure and refrain from making any judgments about the 
Interactant whom they had been asked to code. Thus, coders were explicitly instructed to 
code observable behaviour and not behaviour that they expected to see or inferred their target 
would do on other occasions. No participant studied the same Interactant’s behaviour in more 
than one interaction condition. This ensured that analyses concerning overlap between cues 
valid and cues utilised (H4) were not confounded with the coding procedure (see also Funder 
& Colvin, 1991).  
        The experimenter was present throughout the behaviour coding to ensure that each coder 
independently rated Interactants’ behaviour without influence from any other coders in the 
room. Participants received no additional training instruction, which is consistent with 
previous research showing that naive raters can produce reliable ratings without in-depth 
training (e.g., Rosenthal, 1987; Rosenthal, Blanck, & Vannicelli, 1984). 
 
10. Results & Discussion 
As each coder rated a total of 6 Interactants, the scores are non-independent; thus, to err 
on the side of caution, a second measure of agreement is needed that takes this issue into 
consideration. As recommended by Shrout and Fleiss (1979) the ICC (2, k) agreement statistic 
was employed. The average agreement amongst coders was equivalent to that found above 
ICCmean = .87 (Range .64 to .94). Means for each behaviour and Cronbach alphas were computed 
for each interaction (see Table 2). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
10.1 Analytic Strategy for Personality-Behaviour Links 
The Brunswik (1956) model explicates how a researcher can examine the process of 
personality judgments as articulated in RAM (see Figure 2). Specifically, availability may be 
assessed through the coding of behaviour itself. In other words, if a team of research 
assistants can reliably code a target’s behaviours, then those behaviours must in some sense 
be available (see Figure 2, A). The notion of relevance concerns the cues that are valid 
indicators of personality (i.e., cues valid). In Brunswik’s model this is measured by the cues 
that correlate with personality (see Figure 2, B).  RAM’s third stage of detection refers to the 
cues that judges seem to employ in their judgments of a target, which may or may not 
represent valid cues to the target’s personality. In Brunswik’s model this is measured by the 
cues that correlate with judgments formed (see Figure 2, C), and is referred to as ‘cues 
utilised’. To fully integrate RAM and Brunswik’s model, the overlap (measured via 
correlations) between cues valid and cues utilised should lead to judgment accuracy, and thus 
successful utilisation (see Figure 2, D).  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
To examine more directly the relation between cues utilised and cues valid, the fourth 
hypothesis predicted that the most accurately judged traits (in order of magnitude) would 
demonstrate the highest levels of overlap between cues utilised and cues valid.  This issue 
required an additional set of correlations. Specifically, as recommended by Steiger (1980; and 
employed by Gosling et al., 2002 and Funder & Sneed, 1993), inter-correlations were 
performed between the cue-utilisation correlations and the cue-validity correlations for 
Interactants and Observers using Fishers r-to-z transformation (and were transformed back to 
r for presentation). The correlations were computed for each Big-5 trait. In other words, the 
overlap between cues utilised and cues valid were examined to determine what Brunswik 
called ‘achievement’ (i.e., the achievement of accuracy) (see Table 3).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Recall that, in order of magnitude the traits that were most accurately judged for 
Interactants were extraversion, (rmean = .17), neuroticism (rmean = .16), agreeableness (rmean  = 
.03), conscientiousness (rmean  = .01) and finally openness (rmean = -.19).  A similar pattern of 
accuracy was found for Observers whereby extraversion was the most accurately judged 
(rmean = .32), followed by neuroticism, (rmean = .16), conscientiousness, (rmean = .13), 
agreeableness (rmean = .03) and finally openness to experience was also the least accurately 
judged trait for Observers (rmean = .03). As shown in Table 3, the hypothesis that a significant 
level of overlap would be found between cue utilisation and cue validity correlations was 
partially confirmed. Specifically, the hypothesis was confirmed for both Interactants, r = .50,  
p < .05, and Observers, r = .64, p < .01 for the trait of extraversion suggesting that valid cues 
were used when rating this most accurately rated trait.  
Recall in phase 2 that when Observers’ ratings were compared with Interactants’ 
ratings, Observers were more accurate when rating the less interpersonal traits of 
conscientiousness and openness.  Interestingly, in terms of the intercorrelations between cue 
validity (i.e., correlations between cue and self-reported personality) and Observers cue 
utilisation correlations (i.e., correlations between Observers’ judgments formed and cue) a 
significant level of overlap was found for the trait of conscientiousness, r = .51,  p < .05 but 
not for the trait of openness. However, it should be noted that although the correlation for 
openness was low for Observers, it was positive, whereas the overlap between cue utilisation 
and cue validity for Interactants was negative for openness, r = -.66, p < .01.  
To further understand the differences in accuracy between Interactants and Observers 
accuracy, it would seem useful to compare, at a descriptive level, the intercorrelations 
between cue utilisation and cue validity for Interactants and Observers. As shown in Tables 4 
to 6, intercorrelations for extraversion indicated that Interactants appeared to detect and 
utilise valid interpersonal type behaviours such as ‘starts conversation‘, r = .61, ‘quick to 
understand ‘, r = .42 and ‘laughs‘, r = .47 whereas Observers appeared to accurately detect 
and utilise cues related to assertive type behaviours such as ‘takes charge‘, r = .50, and 
‘starts conversation‘, r = .48  as well as interpersonal type behaviours such as ‘appears at 
ease’, r = .43 and ‘smiles‘, r = .54. Similarly, for agreeableness, Interactants detected and 
utilised cues such as ‘agrees with partner‘, r = .60, ‘moans‘, r = -.55 and ‘smiles‘, r = .45, 
whereas Observers detected and utilised cues such as ‘uses hand when talking‘, r = -.54 and 
‘inquires about others‘, r = .58. Interestingly, cue utilisation correlations for 
conscientiousness appear to be very different for Interactants and Observers. That is, 
Interactants had no significant cue validity correlations (with the exception of ‘takes 
conversation to a higher level) whereas Observers correctly detected the valid cue of ‘nods 
head‘, r = .52, ‘avoids eye contact‘, r = -.51 and ‘pays attention to detail‘, r = .59 when rating 
the trait of conscientiousness. For neuroticism, Interactants appeared to utilise the cue of 
‘fidgets‘, r = -.56 whereas Observers detected the cue of ‘anxious‘, r = -.47 and ‘quick to 
understand, ‘r = .42 (see Tables 4 to 6).  
Given the lower accuracy reported for openness in both phases (relative to the other 
traits) the finding that this trait produced the smallest number of cue utilisation correlations 
(see underlined values in Tables 4 to 6) those of Borkenau and Liebler (1995) and Funder and 
Sneed (1993) who also found that judges seem to employ the wrong cues when judging this 
trait. This supports the lower accuracy found for this trait in general and assertions that this 
trait is difficult to detect through overt behaviour. Interestingly, this finding suggests that the 
lower accuracy found for openness may be explained by judges detecting the wrong cues as 
opposed to a lack of valid cues per se. The trait of conscientiousness stood out as showing the 
biggest discrepancy between Interactants and Observer for cues detected. Specifically, out of 
the cues examined, Interactants did not appear to use any of the valid cues available when 
rating their impression of their partner‘s personality (see Tables 4 and 5). Interestingly, this 
may partially explain the low accuracy found for Interactants relative to Observers and again 
supports RAM’s claim that accurate judgments are based on detecting valid cues. As 
behavioural coders were not asked to count how many times a person engaged in behaviours 
(i.e., number of eyebrow twitches) the salience of a behaviour may have affected the 
perceived frequency (e.g., a broad smile may have led to higher ratings than 2-3 minor 
smirks)7. Although this is possible, we believe that our findings are in line with numerous 
researchers in this field (e.g., Borkenau & Liebler, 1995; Funder & Colvin, 1991; Funder & 
Sneed, 1993). Also, as we focus on relative accuracy across contexts this potential error 
variance should cancel itself out across the three contexts examined.  
When viewed together, the findings suggest that although the number of cues 
available for conscientiousness were low, Observers were able to utilise these cues more 
successfully than Interactants across contexts. In terms of openness, findings suggest that 
Observers found judging this trait difficult (r = .05) but Interactants appeared to find judging 
this trait even more difficult (r = -.66; See Tables 4 to 6). It will be useful for future research 
to determine if the present findings can be replicated and conduct research that directly asks 
participants what cues they used in their judgments. 
                                                 
7 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. It will be interesting for future research 
to directly explore this possibility. 
 11. General Discussion 
The present study sought to develop our understanding of how accurate personality 
judgments are formed. To explore this question phase 1 examined when we are more likely to 
be accurate (Get to know vs. Negotiation contexts), phase 2 examined who is more likely to 
render an accurate judgment (Interactant vs. Observer) and phase 3 explored this question 
more directly and examined how we form judgments (Behavioural Coding) in addition to 
how Observers and Interactants may differ in this process. Results indicated that differences 
in tasks examined (i.e., get to know vs. negotiation) did not impact on accuracy but that 
differences in partner did for the trait of conscientiousness. Our findings also revealed 
important differences in trait specific accuracy in terms of whether a judge was an Interactant 
or an Observer whereby Observers were more accurate when rating the less interpersonal 
traits of conscientiousness and openness.  
The findings in phase 1 provided some support for the differential role of the amount 
of cues available (but not trait specific cues) on accuracy by showing that accuracy for 
conscientiousness was higher in the negotiation interaction where participants interacted with 
the same partner, however, accuracy for neuroticism was higher when participants engaged in 
a second ‘get to know’ interaction with a different partner. A plausible explanation is that 
quantity of information can be useful for conscientiousness as participants arguably had more 
cues available over two different interactions with the same partner. In contrast, familiarity 
with the task appears to be useful when rating traits such as neuroticism. Tables 4 to 6 
showed that more cues were utilised in interaction two than in interaction one suggesting that 
familiarity may increase detection. Although this task did not find that manipulating the 
amount of trait specific cues available through a negotiation task increased judgment 
accuracy it will be interesting for future researchers to explore other tasks that may be more 
effective, building on the work of Gosling et al., (2002). To provide further support for this 
claim future researchers could ask Interactants and Observers to report how they felt within 
the interaction in terms of ‘comfortableness’, cognitive load, and motivation to judge 
accurately, among others. 
Phases two and three went some way to developing our understanding of the role of 
the amount of information (information quantity) as opposed to the amount of trait specific 
information (information quality) on accuracy as they revealed that the types of cues that 
Interactants’ and Observers’ focus on differed by trait and in terms of the type of cue that was 
relevant. Specifically, results showed that Observers were more accurate when rating the less 
interpersonal traits of conscientiousness and openness whereas Interactants were more 
accurate when rating the “visible” trait of extroversion. Our finding that the inherently more 
“visible” trait of extroversion was rated more accurately by Interactants, relative to other 
traits, corroborates research in this area (Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988; Funder & Colvin, 
1988). Our finding that Observers were less accurate when rating this trait is an interesting 
finding given the high visibility often attributed to this trait and suggests that the salience or 
visibility of a trait may relate to perspective type. 
Further support for the link between perspective type and saliency of cue comes from 
the cue level analysis which revealed that the type of cue that Observers detected differed to 
Interactants in interesting ways. Specifically, cues related to “turn-taking” and “interpersonal 
type” behaviours (e.g., laughs, nods head) were found for Interactants whereas assertive type 
behaviours (e.g., takes charge) were noticed by Observers – (i.e., who stood out vs. how 
someone responds). The differential salience of cues has previously been discussed (Wall et 
al., 2013) and our findings suggest that different judgement perspectives may attend to and 
utilise different types of cues, which is in line with RAM (Funder 1995, 1999). That is, even 
when a range of relevant information is available an accurate judgement will not result if 
judges do not notice or use it in their assessments of others. In support of this explanation, 
Ames and Bianchi (2008) found an “agreeableness asymmetry” whereby supervisees but not 
supervisors were more inclined to notice whether their supervisor was warm and trustworthy 
whereas supervisors we more inclined to notice cues relevant to their supervisees reliability. 
Although substantive their study looked at perceptions (i.e., cue utilisation) and not cue 
validity; thus, the present findings develop and extend this line of theorising and suggest that 
people seem to attend to different cues which can impact on the accuracy of personality 
judgements. These findings are interesting and warrant further investigation and replication. 
One promising avenue for future investigation would be to examine why Observers detect 
cues relevant to different traits.  Indeed, other studies suggest that although the process of 
accuracy may be data driven (i.e., bottom up) it is largely based on pre-existing knowledge. 
In support, a study by Biesanz, West, and Millevoi (2007) found that when judges were less 
acquainted with a target, and thus presumably had less individuating information, judgements 
were based more on generalised (i.e., stereotypical, top-down) knowledge as opposed to 
knowledge about a specific person. 
When theorising about how accurate judgements are formed, our finding that 
Observers were accurate for certain traits supports Funder’s (1995) suggestion that 
moderators of accuracy interact. Funder commented that a judge by trait interaction should be 
termed expertise. That is, he argues that such a finding may arise due to differential 
knowledge of trait behaviour relations or self-serving differences in judges’ 
conceptualisations of traits (see Funder, 1995, p. 663). As the sample was randomly selected 
and comprised undergraduate students it is unlikely that knowledge of trait behaviour-
relations differed systematically across conditions. The more parsimonious explanation 
arguably relates to self-serving differences between Interactants and Observers (i.e., 
motivational factors). Indeed the results of phase 3 are in line with this possibility as the same 
number of valid cues were available to Observers and Interactants but the type of cue they 
appeared to utilise differed in terms of the interpersonal nature of the trait. Put another way, 
interpersonal traits might be less salient to Observers as knowing how sociable someone is 
likely to be is arguably less relevant to an Observer who will not interact with this person (see 
also Wall, Taylor & Campbell, 2016).   
Although the major aim of this three-phase study was to increase our understanding of 
how we make accurate personality judgements across information contexts it is important to 
consider the contextual variations in cues. At a descriptive level, it can be gleaned from 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 that the cues that were valid indicators of personality in one context were 
not always valid indicators of personality in another context. Although it could be argued that 
this is evidence against traits as consistent patterns of behaviour our findings are actually in 
line with Funder and Colvin’s (1991) substantive study. Specifically, they showed that 
behaviour can and does change across context but that people still demonstrate some 
consistency in behaviour. It is clear from the tables that some behaviours were linked to 
personality traits in more than one context whereas others were not. This therefore supports 
Funder and Colvin’s conclusion that behavioural consistency and change across context can 
occur.  
 
11.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
A number of limitations need to be borne in mind when considering the findings of 
the present study. We acknowledge that our exploration into the availability of trait specific 
cues in phase 1 could have been more systematic in terms of directly disentangling the effects 
of amount of information and trait specific information in addition to addressing order 
effects. However, we believe our exploratory three phase study goes some way to addressing 
the differential role that the amount of information and trait specific information has on 
judgement accuracy and encourage further research in this underexplored area. Indeed, it 
should be acknowledged that it is incredibly difficult to directly investigate information as the 
construct itself has been deemed ‘an ambitious realm that is largely undefined (Beer & 
Brooks, 2011, p. 176; cf Letzring et al., 2008; Beer & Watson, 2010) but we feel that our 
investigation of the availability of the amount of trait specific cues provides a good starting 
point.  
Another potential criticism that can be levied against the studies presented relates to 
the small effect sizes. Importantly, when comparing these effect sizes to other research some 
studies have reported Big-5 accuracy correlations that range from .05 to .13 (Back et al., 
2008; see also Naumann et al., 2009). As judgements were compared across context it is 
relative accuracy (i.e., accuracy across context) as opposed to absolute accuracy (i.e., mean 
level) that is of interest here. As recommended by Cohen it is important to interpret effect 
sizes in context (Glass et al. 1981, p104). The results in the present study examined 
judgements made between unacquainted individuals (i.e., strangers); therefore, given the 
limited information that participants had about each other and the time constraints placed on 
the interaction, these findings are interesting and warrant further exploration.  
It is possible that our study did not have enough power to detect significant effects 
given the small to moderate sample size. However, the comparisons across conditions using a 
repeated measures design reduces this issue. Additionally, a number of significant findings 
emerged that were in line with trait definitions and converged with literature surrounding 
valid cues to personality (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Gosling et al., 2002) and accuracy 
research (Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988; Funder & Colvin, 1988). A strength of the 
current study lies in the focus on ‘real’ people in ‘real’ contexts (Funder, 1999) and the 
exploration of ‘behaviour’ using the same methodological approach throughout. 
Nevertheless, as observers in phase 2 judged the personality of the moderate sample from 
phase 1 it is crucial that the present study is replicated. 
It is possible that, due to the sample comprising undergraduates who typically engage 
in “getting acquainted” activities, the familiarity of the task may have impacted upon 
findings. Although this is possible and warrants replication in a more heterogeneous sample, 
it is important to note that the present aim was to understand how people form initial 
personality judgements. Findings should not be generalised beyond first impression 
encounters, which Funder (1999) also acknowledges as the social and cognitive process 
involved in judging the personality of a well acquainted person may differ.   
In conclusion, our findings suggest that when faced with more information (increase 
in the amount of cues as well as trait specific cues; phase 1) judgement accuracy increases for 
conscientiousness only. Observers were found to be more accurate than Interactants when 
rating the less interpersonal traits of conscientiousness and openness (phase 2) and the role of 
cues appear to be important (phase 3). Critically, our findings suggest that cues differentially 
shape judgement accuracy processes depending on whether we are engaged in an interaction 
or observing an interaction and this, we believe, is an important part of theory development 
that requires further research attention. Put another way: “When Looking at the same 
interaction different information perspectives may see something different”. 
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 Table 1. Interactants Cue Utilisation and Cue Validity Correlations as a Function of 
Interactions in Phase 1 (continues on next page) 
                                 Extraversion                  Agreeableness              Conscientiousness        Neuroticism               Openness 
Interaction 
Behavioural 
Cue 
Int1 Int2 Int3 Int1 Int2 Int3 Int1 Int2 Int3 Int1 Int2 Int3 Int1 Int2 Int3 
Smiles a lot   .58** 
 
.45*  .43ǂ    -.44ǂ      
Uses difficult 
words 
  .45*          .41ǂ   
Neatly dressed -.44ǂ -.46*              
  
Laughs a lot .47*  
 
.52*  .42ǂ  .43ǂ    .51*     
Inquires about  
Others 
 .52*  .55*         -.43ǂ   
Full of ideas -.62**   .44ǂ   -.44ǂ   -.56**      
Fidgets  -.51*  -.44ǂ -.48ǂ 
-.40ǂ 
          
Takes 
conversation 
to a higher 
level 
      .52*   .54*   .48ǂ 
 
.42ǂ  
                
Shows they 
are listening 
.43ǂ .50*  .43ǂ .45*           
Pays attention 
to detail 
 .57** .57** .51*         -.55*   
                
Agrees with 
partner 
 -.56**  .60**  .47*    .52* .55* .55*  -.54* -.54* 
Self touches -.48* .50*     -.46*         
Open body 
language 
 .57**     
.42ǂ 
      .44ǂ   
Interrupts             .55* .51*  
Takes charge  .44*             .53* 
Anxious  -.51*              
 
Acts at ease 
          -.41ǂ     
 
Appears 
relaxed 
  
.51* 
             
Avoid eye 
contact 
 -.44ǂ              
Talks about 
self 
        -.52*       
Moans   -
.56** 
 -.55* -.45*           
Does not 
probe 
  .44ǂ             
Starts 
conversation 
 .61**   -.44ǂ .54*          
Quick to 
understand 
.42ǂ          -.43ǂ     
Note. * p < .05. ǂ p < .10, two-tailed. Values underlined represent cues valid. All other values represent cue 
utilisation correlations. I1, I2 and I3 refer to whether the interaction was interaction one, two or three. 
 
 
Table 2. Mean Behaviours for Each Interaction Situation 
Note. Numbers in superscript denote items taken and adapted from the IPIP-Big5 (see Method 
section, page 21). 1 relates to behaviour items relevant to the trait of extroversion with an internal 
consistency of .93, 2 relates to behaviour items relevant to the trait of agreeableness (internal 
consistency cannot be computed as only one item taken form IPIP). 3 relates to behaviour items 
relevant to the trait of conscientiousness with an internal consistency of (internal consistency cannot 
be computed as only one item taken from IPIP. 4 relates to behaviour items relevant to the trait of 
neuroticism with an internal consistency of 67. 5 relates to behaviour items relevant to the trait of 
openness to experience with an internal consistency of .70. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Behaviour 
 
Interaction 
1 
Interaction 
2 
Interaction 
3 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
1. Starts conversation1  4.70 5.33 4.36 .83 
2. Quick to understand things5  5.56 5.45 5.10 .78 
3. Smiles a lot  4.68 4.55 4.24 .89 
4. Uses difficult words 5 3.74 3.60 3.84 .81 
5. Appears neatly dressed  5.08 4.65 4.79 .78 
6. Laughs a lot  4.08 4.09 3.65 .86 
7. Takes charge1  4.46 4.78 4.49 .86 
8. Inquires about others2  4.53 4.55 3.43 .87 
9. Talks about self  4.70 4.53 4.44 .88 
10. Full of ideas5  4.34 4.35 4.55 .82 
11. Fidgets  4.16 4.21 3.58 .89 
12. Carries conversation to high 
level5  
4.39 4.56 3.88 .86 
13. Nods head  4.44 4.44 3.59 .88 
14. Appears anxious4  3.40 3.41 3.40 .89 
15. Appears at ease4  4.63 4.71 4.38 .87 
16. Waits for others to lead the 
way  
3.56 3.39 3.89 .88 
17. Moans about things4  3.40 3.40 3.54 .87 
18. Shows they are really 
listening  
5.44 5.38 4.95 .90 
19. Appears relaxed most of the 
time4  
4.58 4.81 4.49 .90 
20. Avoids eye contact  3.36 3.11 3.75 .89 
21. Pays attention to details3 5.03 5.13 4.84 .81 
22. Agrees with partner 5.06 5.48 4.29 .75 
23. Self-touches  4.35 4.24 3.63 .89 
24. Open body language  4.69 4.39 4.33 .90 
25. Uses hands when talking  4.51 4.78 4.20 .86 
26. Interrupts  3.03 3.10 3.26 .92 
Table 3. Overlap between Behavioural Cue Utilisation and Cue Validity Correlations for 
Interactants and Observers 
Big-5 trait Interactants Observers 
Extraversion .50** .64** 
Agreeableness -.09 -.06 
Conscientiousness -.23 .51** 
Neuroticism -.26 -.19 
Openness -.66** .05 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .001, two-tailed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Interactants and Observants Cue Utilisation and Cue Validity Correlations as a 
Function of Interactions in Interaction 1 in Phase 1  
 
 
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
Behavioural Cue Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt 
Smiles a lot  .44ǂ .45* .49*   -.44ǂ   .55* 
Uses difficult words         .41ǂ  
Neatly dressed -.44ǂ       -.47*   
Laughs a lot .47* .51*   .43ǂ      
Inquires about 
others 
  .55*      -.43ǂ  
Full of ideas -.62**  .44ǂ  -.44ǂ  -.56**    
Fidgets   -.44ǂ        
Takes conversation 
to a higher level 
    .52*  .54*  .48ǂ  
Shows they are 
listening 
.43ǂ  .43ǂ     .44*   
Pays attention to 
detail 
  .51*      -.55*  
Agrees with partner   .60**    .52*    
Self touches -.48*    -.46*      
Open body 
language 
        .44ǂ  
Interrupts         .55*  
Takes charge  .50*         
Appears Anxious      -.47*  -.47*   
Appears at ease  .43ǂ     -.41ǂ .55*   
Appears relaxed           
Avoid eye contact      -.44*     
Talks about self           
Moans   -.55*        
Starts conversation           
Quick to understand .42ǂ      -.43ǂ .42ǂ   
Nods head  .46*        .43* 
Waits to be led          -.58** 
Uses hands when 
talking 
   -.54*      -.50* 
Note. * p < .05. ǂ p < .10, two-tailed. Values underlined represent cues valid. All other values represent cue 
utilisation correlations. I1, I2 and I3 refer to whether the interaction was interaction one, two or three. 
 
Table 5. Interactants and Observants Cue Utilisation and Cue Validity Correlations as a 
Function of Interactions in Interaction 2 in Phase 1  
 
 
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
Behavioural Cue Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt 
Smiles a lot           
Uses difficult words           
Neatly dressed -.46*          
Laughs a lot .52*      .51* .51*   
Inquires about 
others 
  .55* .58**       
Full of ideas   .44ǂ        
Fidgets -.51*  -.44ǂ        
Takes conversation 
to a higher level 
        .42ǂ  
Shows they are 
listening 
.50*  .43ǂ        
Pays attention to 
detail 
.57**  .51*        
Agrees with partner -.56**  .60** .49*   .55* .55* -.54*  
Self touches .50*          
Open body 
language 
.57**          
Interrupts         .51*  
Takes charge .44*     .42ǂ    .46** 
Anxious -.51*       -.44ǂ   
Appears at ease       -.41ǂ    
Appears relaxed .51*          
Avoid eye contact -.44ǂ          
Talks about self           
Moans -.56**  -.55*        
Starts conversation .61**   .59**      .57** 
Quick to understand       -.43ǂ .55**   
Nods head      .52*     
Waits to be led           
Uses hands when 
talking 
          
Note. * p < .05. ǂ p < .10, two-tailed. Values underlined represent cues valid. All other values represent cue 
utilisation correlations. I1, I2 and I3 refer to whether the interaction was interaction one, two or three. 
 
Table 6. Interactants and Observants Cue Utilisation and Cue Validity Correlations as a 
Function of Interactions in Interaction 3 in Phase 1  
 
 
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness 
Behavioural Cue Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt Int’nt Obsv’nt 
Smiles a lot .58** .54* .43ǂ     .79**   
Uses difficult words .45*          
Neatly dressed           
Laughs a lot .52* .44ǂ      .48*   
Inquires about 
others 
      -.43ǂ    
Full of ideas     -.56** .59*    .52* 
Fidgets           
Takes conversation 
to a higher level 
    .54*  .48ǂ    
Shows they are 
listening 
     .59*     
Pays attention to 
detail 
.57**     .59**    .42ǂ 
Agrees with partner  .52* .47* .50* .52*  -.55*    
Self touches      -.42ǂ     
Open body 
language 
  .42ǂ .57**  .60** .44ǂ   .61** 
Interrupts  .46*    -.42ǂ .55*    
Takes charge        -.49*   
Anxious  .52*    .52*    .58** 
Appears at ease           
Appears relaxed      .71**    .61** 
Avoid eye contact      -.51*    -.42ǂ 
Talks about self           
Moans      -.74**     
Starts conversation  .48* .54*       .51* 
Quick to understand      .44ǂ     
Nods head      .68**  .48*   
Waits to be led  -.48*         
Uses hands when 
talking 
          
Note. * p < .05. ǂ p < .10, two-tailed. Values underlined represent cues valid. All other values represent cue 
utilisation correlations. I1, I2 and I3 refer to whether the interaction was interaction one, two or three. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Visual Representation of Funder’s (1995) Realistic Accuracy Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Brunswik Lens’ Model of Inferential Behavior 
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Note. A refers to the behavioral cues in the environment (RAMS’s availability stage); B refers to cues valid 
(RAM’s relevance stage); C refers to cues utilized (RAM’s detection stage); and D refers to the overlap between 
cues utilized and cues valid (RAMs’ utilization stage)  
 
 
A.  Behavioural 
cue e.g., ‘nods 
head’ 
C. Cues Utilised 
Cues correlated with 
judgments formed 
B. Cues Valid 
Cues correlated with 
aggregate measure of 
target personality  
D. Overlap between cue 
utilisation and validity should 
lead to ‘accurate’ judgment 
A.  Behavioural 
cue e.g., ‘starts 
conversation’ 
